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BACKGROUND – THE COLLAPSE OF
LEHMAN BROTHERS
Lehman Brothers – a Wall Street institution that could
trace its origins back over 150 years – declared itself
insolvent by filing for chapter 11 protection against its
creditors in the early hours of Monday, September 15,
2008. One report spoke of a gathering – in a first-floor
conference room at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
– of a huddle of senior Lehman Brothers executives who
realised that their firm was in serious difficulties: “A last -
ditch effort to get Barclays to buy Lehman had failed: the
British were not coming”.
Bankruptcy was the only card left to play: “People were
enormously upset,” recalls Rodgin Cohen, a partner at the
law firm Sullivan & Cromwell. He was advising Lehman on
its bankruptcy on the afternoon of Sunday, September 14,
2008. “But this was a group of professionals. There was
anger but there wasn’t any screaming or running around.
Everybody had been living this 24/7 so, really, there was an
element of exhaustion” (Andrew Clark, guardian.co.uk,
September 4, 2009).
It was to be the biggest bankruptcy in US history.
President Bush would later sign an emergency order
providing government insurance to the $3.5 trillion that was
tied up in money market funds. The Lehman collapse
affected not only the United States: it triggered a global
financial crisis. An account of the sub-prime fiasco and the
collapse of Lehman Brothers is contained in Alex Brummer’s
book The Crunch: how greed and incompetence sparked the credit
crisis, published in 2009 by Random House Business Books.
What led to the collapse of institutions like Lehman
Brothers? I suggest that there were at least four
contributing factors.
Breach of a classic rule of banking
The traditional UK building society takes in deposits
from investors and uses those deposits to lend out money
to house purchasers, taking a mortgage on the property to
secure the money loaned. Care is taken in valuing the
property to be purchased and in checking out the
borrower: are the borrower’s circumstances –
job/wages/commitments, and so on – such as to indicate
that the borrower will be able to finance the loan: a loan
which may well be repayable over something like 25 years?
The same approach applied in the United States, as Alex
Brummer (supra) explains on page 19:
“America’s traditional housing market, dealing with prime
borrowers, had worked along well-established lines for many
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years. Banks financed mortgages through deposits received
from customers. At the same time, potential home buyers were
scrutinised closely for their ability to make repayments, and
there was a vigorous valuation of the house they planned to
buy. In other words, proper precautions were taken. Lenders
would extend home loans only to those who were deemed good
risks.”
Lehman Brothers breached the classic banking rule in
two ways. First, by lending recklessly to borrowers who
were a bad risk: the so-called sub-prime borrowers.
Second, by lending – not out of deposits from bank
customers – but by borrowing in the market. They
borrowed short (at high interest rates in the market) and
lent long (at comparatively lower interest rates to their sub-
prime borrowers). This latter manoeuvre – leverage – is
fine: until interest rates rise.
Reckless lending: sub-prime mortgages, liar loans –
and leverage
The sub-prime game
There were millions of people in America who could not
satisfy the strict criteria for borrowing long-term to buy a
home. But low interest rates might help them to get onto the
housing ladder. So the sub-prime mortgage was invented:
“Prime mortgages went to the better off; sub-prime went to
the far end of the market, to those who had never qualified
for a mortgage before (Alex Brummer, supra, p 17).”
These type of loans were high-risk. Ben S Bernanke, at
a speech made at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s
43rd annual conference on Bank Structure and
Competition, Chicago, Illinois on May 17, 2007 said:
“Subprime mortgages are loans made to borrowers who are
perceived to have high credit risk, often because they lack a
strong credit history or have other characteristics that are
associated with high probabilities of default. Having emerged
more than two decades ago, subprime mortgage lending began
to expand in earnest in the mid-1990s, the expansion
spurred in large part by innovations that reduced the costs for
lenders of assessing and pricing risks. In particular,
technological advances facilitated credit scoring by making it
easier for lenders to collect and disseminate information on
the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers. In addition,
lenders developed new techniques for using this information to
determine underwriting standards, set interest rates, and
manage their risks.”
Lending money is easy. Getting it back may be more
difficult. Lending to those who would normally not be
considered for a loan might be an acceptable practice while
property values were rising - and interest rates were low.
The problems start when property prices fall – particularly
with borrowers who had little chance of repaying their
mortgages.
These were the borrowers to whom the so-called “ninja
loans” or “liar loans” might have been made. A ninja loan
is a type issued to borrowers with “No Income, No Job,
and No Assets”. The similar liar loan refers to a category of
mortgages known as low-documentation or no-
documentation mortgages. These type of loans opened the
door for unethical behaviour by borrowers – and by
lenders and mortgage brokers.
Many of the sub-prime borrowers were from the trailer
parks and the inner cities of the United States. The impact
on these borrowers – some faced with initially low interest
rates on their mortgages that would later increase
alarmingly – could be devastating.
The Wall Street Journal Online in an article in October 2007
(http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB1192059255
19455321.html) gave an example of the human problems
arising from sub-prime mortgages:
“Last September, Darla Ball, a printer and copier
saleswoman, purchased a $460,000 home in Las Vegas
using an adjustable-rate subprime loan with an initial rate of
8.2%. At the time, she says, she expected to refinance before
her interest rate resets to 14% next year, which will raise her
monthly payments to $8,000 from $3,700. But in the past
year, she says, prices of comparable homes in her subdivision
have fallen to $310,000, which means she would not qualify
for a new $460,000 mortgage, unless home values go back
up to that level, an unlikely scenario. She says she has
stopped paying her mortgage and is trying to negotiate with
her lender. ‘I’m going to lose my home anyway,’ she says, ‘so
why pay?’”
Those jumping on the bandwagon to make money from
the sub-prime market included some unsavoury characters:
“Sub-prime lending has been likened to selling used cars in
bad neighbourhoods – that is to say it is definitely not for
those with delicate scruples or refined manners. From this
vantage point it can be seen as a seedy tale with a sleazy cast:
a bunch of snake – oil salesmen, hucksters and crooks fleecing
millions of vulnerable Americans in an attempt to keep the
housing bubble going, to make themselves fat commissions, to
create new financial instruments that could be used as
speculative plays on Wall Street…”
The demand for mortgage brokers acting between
borrower and lender in the sub-prime market was so great
that in Las Vegas “every stripper, waiter and bartender on
the Strip had a broker’s licence.” (Alex Brummer, supra,
pp24/34)
Liar loans in the UK
In October 2009 the UK’s Financial Services Authority
(FSA) decided to take steps to eliminate the use of the liar
loan, as an article by Katherine Griffiths and Rebecca
O’Connor published in The Times on October 13, 2009
makes clear:
“The multi-billion self – certification industry, in which
customers are not required to provide proof of income, is set to
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be banned by the financial regulator. Dubbed ‘liar’s loans’ by
critics, self-cert loans were blamed for playing a large part in
the housing bubble and ensuing financial crisis. The (FSA) is
effectively planning to kill off self-cert home loans by
introducing a rule compelling lenders to insist that customers
provide evidence of their income…the loans have been vilified
as being at the heart of the banks’ toxic loans problem
because some customers have lied about their income.”
Leverage
What made reckless lending in the sub-prime market
worse was that Lehman was providing finance for that
market – not by using money banked by its depositors –
but by borrowing in the money market. Gearing up –
borrowing money to invest – enables an investor to
increase its returns. Fine when interest rates are low. But
when rates rise the picture is different.
A cautious bank might have leverage of, say, 10 times: so
for every £1 million of cash/assets it will lend £10 million.
Lehman got to the stage where it was leveraged over 44
times. Lehman had $18 billion of equity on its balance
sheet, but had investments – home loans and other
investments – of nearly $800 billion. Analysis of loan data
by the Wall Street Journal Online 2007 (supra) indicates that:
“from 2004 to 2006, when home prices peaked in many
parts of the country, more than 2,500 banks, thrifts, credit
unions and mortgage companies made a combined $1.5
trillion in high-interest-rate loans. Most subprime loans,
which are extended to borrowers with sketchy credit or
stretched finances, fall into this basket.”
Lehman’s shares would fall from a peak of $85 to 10
cents.
Securitisation: slicing and dicing
A third factor contributing to the collapse of institutions
like Lehman Brothers was securitisation: the practice
under which lenders package up mortgage loans and sell
them on to investment banks in the form of mortgage-
backed securities: and in the process getting the loans off
the lenders’ balance sheets. George Soros observed on
page 117 of The Crash of 2008 and What it Means, published
by PublicAffairs, New York: “…banks were anxious to
avoid holding loans on their balance sheets; they preferred
to package them and sell them off to investors who were
not subject to supervision and persuasion by the
regulatory authorities.”
New products were created out of the securitisation of
mortgages: “credit derivatives.” Lehman Brothers was
amongst the American institutions that operated in this
area: “Tens of thousands of mortgages were placed in pools
to spread out the risks and then divided into slices, known
as tranches, based on quality (Alex Brummer, supra, p 40).”
But at the end of the day much of the backing for these
sophisticated financial instruments was still the sub-prime
mortgage. With rising interest rates and the fall in property
values many of those sub-prime mortgages were not worth
the paper they were written on.
Credit rating agencies
Part of the securitisation process relied on credit
agencies. The packaging process whereby bundles of
mortgages could be sold on and traded as securities on the
market – just like company shares – depended on those
packages of home loans gaining a credit rating.
“Endorsing these loans were the credit rating agencies …
which lent their stamp of approval to packages of structured
mortgage debt. The alchemy was now complete. Sub-prime
mortgages had been disguised as first-class assets…” (Alex
Brummer, supra, p 38).
CLAIMS RELATED TO THE LEHMAN
COLLAPSE
Various losers in the so-called “credit crunch” triggered
by the collapse of Lehman Brothers may have claims in
relation to investments that have gone radically wrong:
claims, for example, against Lehman Brothers itself.
Those entitled to make such claims will include
investors, shareholders, trustees, liquidators and receivers.
The claims may be against investment banks that devised
securities deriving from sub-prime mortgages;
underwriters; pension funds; and salesmen. Those claims
could be based on negligent mis-statement,
misrepresentation, breach of contract or the tort of deceit.
AN EXAMPLE OF A CREDIT CRUNCH
CLAIM – AND A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
The financial crisis triggered by the collapse of Lehman
Brothers has led to claims in the US civil courts - and to a
criminal prosecution. Two examples are given – a civil
claim involving Dick Fulds, the former chairman of
Lehman Brothers; and a criminal prosecution against
former Bear Stearns hedge fund managers: the first major
criminal trial arising out of the sub-crime mortgage fiasco.
Fogel Capital Management, et al v Fuld, et al
Case number 08-CV-08225, filed on September 24,
2008 in the United States District Court, Southern
District of New York: Judge Stein.
Stanford Law School describes the basis of the case: the claim
alleges misstatement in a prospectus in relation of the impact on
Lehman Brothers of under performing sub-prime related
products (see http://securities.stanford.edu/1041/LEHMQ_01/).
The class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of all persons
who purchased the preferred series “J” stock of Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc. The claim was against certain officers
and directors of Lehman and certain underwriters of the
offering, and was made pursuant to sections 11 and 15 of the
Securities Act of 193315 U.S.C. ss 77k, 77l and 77o.
The underwriters included Bank of America Securities
LLC, Citigroup Global Markets Inc, Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Morgan Stanley & Co Inc, UBS Securities and Wachovia
Capital Markets.
The complaint asserted that Lehman’s prospectus
contained both material misstatements and omissions
which the plaintiff and the class relied upon to their
detriment. The representations made in the company’s
prospectus were materially false and misleading because, at
the time of the offering, Lehman was already suffering
from several adverse factors that were not revealed and/or
adequately addressed in the document: these included the
failure to set aside adequate allowances to cover the
company’s ever-increasing portfolio of under-performing
sub-prime related products and to adequately write-down
commercial and residential mortgage and real estate assets.
These factors were already causing a material adverse
affect on Lehman’s business and directly led to Lehman’s
September 15, 2008 announcement that it was seeking
protection under the Federal Bankruptcy Code in the
largest bankruptcy filing in US history. The complaint
alleged that the defendants could have – and should have –
discovered the material misstatements and omissions in the
company’s prospectus prior to its filing with the SEC and
distribution to the investing public. Instead, they failed to
do so as a result of a negligent and grossly inadequate due
diligence investigation.
On September 15, 2008, Lehman filed a voluntary
petition to reorganise under chapter 11 of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code in the US Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York in the largest bankruptcy
filing in history. The investment interests of the class were
largely wiped out.
As a result of the dissemination of the false and
misleading statements set out in the Complaint, the market
price of Lehman preferred J was artificially inflated during
the class period. In ignorance of the false and misleading
nature of the statements described in the complaint, the
plaintiff and the other members of the class relied, to their
detriment, on the integrity of the market price of Lehman
preferred J. Had the plaintiff and the other members of the
class known the truth, they would not have purchased the
securities, or would not have purchased them at the
inflated prices that were paid.
USA v Cioffi & Tannin, US District Court for the
Eastern District of New York No 08-415
Two former Bear Stearns hedge fund managers, Ralph
Cioffi and Matthew Tannin, managed two funds “crammed
with subprime mortgage-backed securities, that lost
institutional and individual investors a total of $1.6 billion
when the funds collapsed in mid-2007 at an early phase of
the Wall Street market meltdown.”
The case, described as the first major prosecution arising
from the collapse of major US financial institutions “was
seen as a litmus test of whether a jury, presented with
evidence from emails between money managers and
conference calls with investors, would convict individuals
for corporate collapses.”
Much of the government’s evidence in the case was
focused on: “emails among the two men, other colleagues
at Bear Stearns and investors. The government said
investors were lied to or misled on at least two conference
calls with investors.”
But the defence lawyers argued that prosecutors “took
snippets of emails and presented them out of context, a
point that appeared to resonate with the jury.” Cioffi and
Tannin were acquitted of all charges on the second day of
deliberations by a jury in the US District Court in
Brooklyn, New York: the jury acquitted both men of
conspiracy, securities fraud and wire fraud (see Reuters,
November 11, 2009).
A HONG KONG MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION SCHEME AIMED AT
DEALING SPEEDILY WITH LEHMAN
BROTHERS-RELATED CLAIMS
The scheme: an overview
In October 2008 the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
(HKMA) announced that the Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) would administer a Lehman
Brothers-Related products dispute mediation and
arbitration scheme.
Cases may proceed to mediation under the scheme in
two circumstances. The first is where an investor’s
complaint in relation to Lehman products has been
referred by HKMA to the Securities and Futures
Commission (SFC). Here, the SFC will decide what
further action is required. The second is where bank and
customer have themselves agreed to go to mediation under
the scheme.
HKMA stated that, under the scheme, the mediation
process would be a confidential, voluntary, non-binding
and private dispute resolution process “in which a neutral
person (the mediator) helps the parties to reach a
negotiated settlement or to narrow the issues in dispute.
Successful settlement through mediation will obviate the
need for costly and lengthy litigation.”
If mediation under the scheme is not successful, the
parties involved may agree to binding arbitration by the
HKIAC: “a separate person is appointed as arbitrator, using
as far as possible a documents-only process. The arbitrator
decides the claim and the decision is final.”
The purpose of the Scheme is to help resolve “questions
of compensation between investors in Lehman-Brothers-
related products and licensed banks.” The HKMA is to pay
half of the fee for the service provided by the scheme, the
other half being paid by the bank in question.10
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In cases subsidised by the HKMA, the complainant and
the bank are reminded of the availability of the mediation
service and informed of the procedures. Once the two
parties have agreed to mediation, the parties may agree on
a mediator from a list to be provided by HKIAC:
alternatively, HKIAC will appoint a mediator from that list.
The mediator is to commence the mediation process as
soon as possible after appointment and is to “use best
endeavours to conclude the mediation within 21 calendar
days of appointment.” If a settlement is reached, the
mediation process ends (and the process is also terminated
if the mediator considers that further attempts at
mediation are no longer justified – or if either party gives
written notification of the termination of the mediation).
If settlement is not achieved, the parties can then
consider whether to move to arbitration under the scheme.
If the parties do agree to arbitrate, they may either choose
an arbitrator from a list provided by the HKIAC, or the
HKIAC will itself appoint an arbitrator from that list. The
parties obviously have the option to litigate in the courts if
they cannot agree on arbitration.
The arbitrator is to conduct a “documents-only”
arbitration under the scheme. Legal representation is not
permitted for either party. The arbitrator is to aim to
conclude the arbitration within 21 calendar days.
The mediation/arbitration scheme
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of the scheme is to
help resolve questions of compensation between investors
in Lehman Brothers-related products and “distributing
banks”.
Definitions
Section 1 of the HKIAC Scheme contains definitions.
“Respondent” is defined as a licensed bank authorised
under section 16 of the Hong Kong Banking Ordinance
and against which a claim is made under the Scheme.
“Mediation” is defined as the process of mediation of a
claim referred by the HKMA to the scheme.
Mediation
Section 2 contains the provisions relating to mediation.
The mediator is to be appointed by HKIAC from its list of
scheme mediators, after taking into account any
preferences of the parties.
The mediation may be conducted in any manner that the
mediator considers appropriate, taking into account the
circumstances of the case, the wishes of the parties and the
need for a speedy resolution of the dispute. The mediation
should be completed within 21 days [rule 1].
The mediator may see the parties together and in
separate “caucus” sessions or private meetings. The
writer’s experience as mediator – and as counsel in
mediations – is that the caucus sessions are of enormous
benefit in seeking to help the parties reach a settlement in
commercial disputes. In those sessions, information given
to the mediator in confidence by a party will only be
revealed to the other party provided the mediator has
express permission to reveal that information. The caucus
sessions help the mediator to explore with the parties
possible ways of resolving the dispute.
If there is no settlement the mediator is to help the
parties to agree common facts that can be used in any
subsequent arbitration or court hearing [rule 2]. Legal
representation is not permitted in the mediation [rule 3].
If agreement is reached, the parties are to sign a settlement
agreement [rule 4]. As mentioned earlier, the rules provide
that the mediation will also be terminated if the mediator
considers that further attempts to reach agreement are not
justified. Either party may terminate the mediation at any
time by serving notice.
The process is confidential, and opinions and the like
relating to the mediation are not to be revealed unless the
parties and the mediator agree in writing or they are
“compelled by law” [rule 5]. The language of the
mediation is to be decided by the mediator [rule 6].
The mediator may not be appointed as arbitrator,
counsel or expert in any subsequent arbitration [rule 7].
Arbitration
Section 3 contains the provisions relating to arbitration.
If no settlement has been reached - and provided that the
mediation has been terminated in accordance with rule 4
and the parties have agreed to arbitrate under the scheme
- either party may serve notice requiring the dispute to go
on to arbitration.
This is to be a “documents-only” arbitration, and the
rules state that arbitration is not to be used in
circumstances where there are complex issues or where
there will be “substantial examination of witnesses”: the
scheme is designed for use in arbitrations only where the
issues in dispute are “limited in number” [rule 9].
(Paragraph 2(b) of the notes to the scheme makes it clear
that, on failure to reach agreement under the mediation
process, the parties may agree to proceed to a documents-
only arbitration. However, such arbitration is not to be
used in all types of disputes, and in particular is not
intended to deal with complex issues).
The arbitrator is to be appointed by HKIAC from its list
of scheme arbitrators, again after taking into account any
preferences indicated by the parties [rule 10].
Rule 11 contains provisions for the conduct of the
arbitration. The arbitrator is to decide the claimant’s case
on the basis of “the documents submitted and evidence
provided”, and is to ensure that the parties are treated with
equality and that each party is given a fair opportunity to
present its case, give its reasons and provide evidence. 11
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The arbitrator may call for further information,
documents and statements. And whilst the arbitration is
described as “documents-only”, the arbitrator may call the
parties to an informal hearing for the purposes of seeking
further clarification.
And again, whilst the rules state that there are to be no
“in-person” hearings (and those are defined as including
teleconferences, video conferences and web conferences),
nevertheless in exceptional circumstances the arbitrator
can call for a hearing – provided the parties are prepared
to shoulder the additional costs involved.
The arbitral award is to be rendered within 21 days of
the appointment of the arbitrator – but the time limit may
be extended. As in the case of mediation, no legal
representation is permitted in the arbitration, and matters
arising in the arbitration are not to be disclosed in any
subsequent proceedings unless agreed in writing, or unless
“compelled by law”.
Operation of the scheme
Within a short time of the launch of the scheme, the
Hong Kong Monetary Authority had referred over 300
Lehman-Brothers-related cases to the Securities and
Futures Commission. Those cases involved 16 banks.
As at August 2010 the number of cases referred by
HKMA had exceeded 1,000. A total of 88 cases had
proceeded to mediation, of which 77 had achieved full
settlement: a settlement rate of around 88 per cent.
There are believed to have been a number of cases
settled by direct negotiation between the parties following
the request for mediation.
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
The collapse of Lehman Brothers triggered a financial
crisis worldwide. Governments in many countries were
obliged to consider pumping considerable funds into banks
to prevent their collapse. At the root of many of the
problems faced by the banks was the fallout from the sub-
prime mortgage fiasco. Irresponsible lending caused
problems for lenders and borrowers. Those problems were
worsened by the effect of complex financial instruments
created out of the packaging of bundles of often worthless
sub-prime or “toxic” loans.
Court actions have been launched by those who have
suffered losses as a result of the financial crisis that
followed the collapse of Lehman. There has not perhaps
been the flood of litigation that was expected in the UK,
but in the United States at any rate class actions are on the
move. And the first major criminal prosecution relating to
sub-prime mortgages has already taken place in America.
In one jurisdiction – Hong Kong – a possibly unique
method of dealing with Lehman Brothers claims has been
launched. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority
announcement that the Hong Kong International
Arbitration Centre would administer a Lehman Brothers-
related products dispute mediation and arbitration scheme
may set an example that other jurisdictions might usefully
follow. Litigation in the civil courts (and prosecutions in
the criminal courts) may be inevitable. But arbitration and
mediation have much to offer: not least in potential savings
in time and cost. And both methods of dispute resolution
offer a degree of confidentiality.
Perhaps Hong Kong is showing other jurisdictions an
alternative method for dealing with Lehman Brothers
claims.
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